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Although sharecropping has long fascinated economists, the determinants of this 
contractual form are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral 
hazard is far from settled. We address both issues by emphasizing the role of landlord 
supervision. When tenant effort is observable, but at a cost to the landlord, otherwise 
identical share-tenants can receive different levels of supervision and have different 
productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from sharetenants in rural 
Pakistan confirm that, controlling for selection, "supervised" tenants are significantly 
more productive than "unsupervised" ones. Also, landlords’ decisions regarding the 
intensity of supervision and the type of incentive contract to offer depend importantly on 
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d1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Sharecropping, among the archetypical incentive problems, has fascinated economists
since Adam Smith (see, e.g., Laﬀont and Martimort, 2001). Despite the continued high
prevalence of sharecropping in much of the developing world and a vast theoretical lit-
erature seeking to explain it, there have only been scattered attempts to link observed
contractual forms in agriculture to speciﬁc models of the principal-agent relationship (re-
cently, see Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002; Laﬀont and Matoussi, 1995; Pandey, 2004).
Most empirical attention has instead focused on the sharecropper-productivity debate;
the question of whether tenant eﬀort is indeed prohibitively costly to monitor, thereby
leading to moral hazard (cf., Stiglitz, 1974), or whether underprovision of tenant eﬀort
is obviated by landlord supervision (as argued by, e.g., Johnson, 1950). While Sha-
ban’s (1987) landmark study appeared to vindicate the moral hazard view, evidence for
the ‘superiority’ of owner-cultivation or ﬁxed rental over sharecropping is, on the whole,
inconclusive (Otsuka, et al., 1992; Binswanger, et al., 1995).1
In this paper, we argue that heterogeneity in supervision costs has important impli-
cations for both of these strands of the empirical literature on land tenancy. To show
this, we develop a simple model in which tenant eﬀort is observable and enforceable, but
at a cost to the landlord. Tenants vary in their ex-ante wealth, landlords in their cost
of supervision, and equilibrium in the tenancy market is achieved through a process of
matching along these two dimensions. The model yields two insights: First, otherwise
identical share-tenants can receive diﬀerent levels of supervision and, consequently, have
diﬀerent productivities. Second, a landlord’s decisions regarding the intensity of super-
vision and the type of incentive contract to oﬀer are driven (in a fairly restricted way) by
his cost of supervision.
Our empirical work, which uses a large and detailed micro-level data set from rural
Pakistan, begins by estimating the average yield diﬀerential between sharecropped and
owner-cultivated plots cultivated by the same household. We are able to state with high
conﬁdence that this diﬀerential is small, a conclusion supported by evidence on family labor
allocation. Next, using unique information on monitoring frequency collected directly
from tenants, we demonstrate that yields on plots cultivated by ‘unsupervised’ tenants
1In Laﬀont and Mattousi’s (1995) study of tenancy in a Tunisian village, for example, sharecropper
productivity (evaluated at mean tenure duration) is higher than that of owner/renters. On the other
hand, recent evidence from a tenancy reform in West Bengal (Banerjee, et al., 2002) shows that a modest
reallocation of property rights in favor of share-tenants, falling far short of outright ownership, led to a
dramatic yield increase, much greater than any found in farm-household level data.
1are signiﬁcantly lower than yields on plots cultivated by ‘supervised’ tenants. There are
simply not enough of the former type to generate large overall productivity diﬀerentials
between sharecropped and owner-cultivated plots. Thus, accounting for variation in
landlord supervision can help resolve the sharecropper-productivity debate.
The ﬁnal step in our analysis is to build and estimate an econometric model of con-
tractual choice, tightly linked to the theory, that takes into account both heterogeneity in
l a n d l o r ds u p e r v i s i o nc o s t sa n di nt e n a n tw e a l t h . 2 Consistent with the predictions of our
theoretical model, we ﬁnd that contracts involving high supervision combined with low-
powered incentives are preferred by landlords residing in close proximity to their leased
plots—i.e., by those with low supervision costs. This ﬁnding complements recent work
showing that the nature of the share-contract is, in certain contexts, shaped by risk-sharing
considerations (Pandey, 2004). Our contribution is to highlight the role of supervision
costs in determining the form of share-tenancy.
The results also have important practical implications. To the extent that sharecrop-
ping exerts a serious drag on agricultural productivity, tenancy or land reform may be a
rare example of ‘win-win’ policy. Redistributing property rights over land from wealthy
landlords to poor tenants, in other words, could improve both equity and eﬃciency. Our
analysis, however, provides a rather sobering assessment of the potential productivity
gains from such policies in a setting where share-tenancy, though widespread, has been
hitherto unregulated.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the baseline
analysis of productivity diﬀerentials between sharecropped and owner-cultivated plots, as
well as the data and context of our study. Section 3 presents the tenancy model with
landlord supervision. The implications of the model for productivity diﬀerentials are
explored in section 4, and for contractual choice in section 5. Section 6 summarizes the
ﬁndings.
2As discussed later, the econometric model is also attentive to landlord-tenant matching along these
two dimensions (see Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002, for a more general discussion of the empirical issues
involved).
22 Is Sharecropping Less Productive?
2.1 Testing for moral hazard
As a backdrop for our empirical analysis, we make a few standard theoretical as-
sumptions that will later be incorporated into the tenancy model of section 3. Consider
a constant returns to scale technology (plot size normalized to one), in which yield y is
produced according to y = f(e,x)+ε, where e is tenant eﬀort, x is a purchased input, and
ε is a random output shock. Net productivity is π = y − px, where p is the normalized
input price. The tenant’s disutility of total eﬀort is given by the convex function v(e).
Sharecropping contracts specify an output share β ∈ (0,1) and possibly also a ﬁxed
component α,w h i c hm a yb en e g a t i v e . We assume that the cost of the purchased input
is shared between landlord and tenant at the same rate as is output; in the model we
consider later this assumption turns out to be innocuous. Suppose further that tenant
eﬀort is noncontractible.
A risk neutral tenant chooses (es,x s) to maximize βπ(e,x) − v(e) − α, giving ﬁrst-
order conditions βfe = v  and fx = p.3 Since any tenancy contract must be incentive-
compatible, moral hazard delivers the unambiguous prediction des
dβ > 0.T h e m a r g i n a l









which, in general, is ambiguous. A suﬃcient condition for
dy
dβ > 0, which we henceforth
assume to hold, is
Assumption A.1 fxe >f efxx/fx.
Tests for moral hazard based on yield data, therefore, have power only to the extent
that tenant eﬀort does not have very close purchased substitutes.4 If fxe is indeed large
and negative, then yield diﬀerentials between sharecropped and owner-cultivated plots may
be negligible even with moral hazard. However, the only input that could conceivably
3Given the additivity of the shock, precisely the same ﬁrst-order conditions would hold for a risk-averse






dβ is unambiguously positive, it might seem preferable to perform the test using net
rather than gross productivity. In practice, however, there are several purchased inputs, each measured
with considerable noise, so that net productivity tends to be less precisely measured than gross productivity.
3substitute strongly for tenant eﬀort is hired labor and, if such substitutability were high
in all tasks (not just for harvesting; see subsection 2.6), there would be little demand for
share-tenants. Landowners could simply self-cultivate using wage labor.
2.2 Data
Our empirical analysis draws upon agricultural production data collected in two sep-
arate household surveys from rural Pakistan. The ﬁrst is round 14 of the IFPRI panel
survey, ﬁe l d e di n1 9 9 3i nf o u rd i s t r i c t sa n d5 2v i l l a g e s . T h es e c o n di st h en a t i o n a l l yr e p -
resentative Pakistan Rural Household Survey (PRHS) of 2001, which collected data from
about 2,800 households sampled across 17 districts and 150 villages. All of the house-
holds in IFPRI-93 were purposively included in PRHS-01. Overall, about 60% of the
households surveyed in 2001 were farm households and, as in 1993, a considerable fraction
of these operated multiple plots. Because much of the plot-level agricultural production
and tenancy data are comparable across the two surveys, part of the empirical work uses
both data sets together. Our analysis of landlord supervision, however, relies solely on
the 2001 survey, since the relevant questions were not asked in 1993.
2.3 Context
As a consequence of Pakistan’s extreme land ownership inequality, the fraction of
tenanted land is high (more than a third), and about two-thirds of this land is under
sharecropping. Despite numerous tenancy laws on the books (regarding eviction and
the sharing of output and costs), contracts are de facto unconstrained, as enforcement is
practically nonexistent.
Sharecropping is the predominant form of tenancy in Sindh province, where the land
ownership distribution is particularly skewed. According to reports by surveyed tenants,
the median landlord owns 28 acres, whereas nearly 80% of the share-tenants are landless
farmers. Large landlords in this region often employ labor supervisors (kamdars)t om a n -
age their many tenants. In the Punjab, the second of the major provinces of Pakistan,
tenancies are split more evenly between share and ﬁxed rent contracts. Landlords in
Punjab are also typically much smaller than in Sindh, with a median holdings of only 7
acres, and are more likely to be resident in the same village as their tenants.
Although nearly three-quarters of share-tenants in our data report a 50-50 output
sharing rule, this probably overstates the degree of uniformity in these contracts. For
example, it is common for tenants to borrow from their landlords, often by taking an
4advance for their share of the input costs, which is typically repaid at harvest time. Output
and cost shares alone thus do not fully characterize the terms of the share-contract.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
Our regression model for yields realized by cultivator c on plot i is
yci = γsci + ω xci + νc + ηci (1)
where sci is an indicator of whether the plot is sharecropped and xci is a vector of ex-
ogenous plot characteristics. Thus, γ estimates the average yield diﬀerential between
sharecropped and owner-cultivated (or rented) plots. The error component νc captures
unobserved factors common to a given cultivator that determine productivity; e.g., access
to credit, farming knowledge, average land quality, and ownership of non-marketed assets
more generally. The error component ηci reﬂects plot-speciﬁc unobservables, such as soil
fertility, that are not contained in xci.
Since, in general, the decision to enter into a sharecropping contract depends upon
the cultivator’s unobserved productivity, E [νc | sci =1 ] =0and OLS estimates of γ are
subject to selection bias. All of the major theories of share-tenancy proposed thus far
in the literature imply that E [νc | sci =1 ]< 0, i.e., that sharecroppers have lower unob-
served productivity than owner-cultivators or ﬁxed renters.5 This means that selection
bias will, if anything, lead to an overstatement of the disincentive eﬀects of share-tenancy.
Our strategy for correcting this selectivity bias is essentially the same as that of Sha-
ban (1987) and Bell (1977). In particular, we use household ﬁxed eﬀects to purge νc.
This procedure requires a suﬃcient number of owner-cum-sharecropper (OCS) households,
owner-cultivators (or renters) that also cultivate at least one sharecropped plot.
Note, ﬁnally, that our household ﬁxed eﬀects estimator (as well as the one used by Sha-
ban) is not robust to correlation between sci and ηci, as would arise, most plausibly, when
there is adverse selection in the leasing market. Under adverse selection, sharecropped
5Models with limited liability (e.g., Shetty, 1998; Basu, 1992; Mookherjee, 1997; Laﬀont and Mattoussi,
1995) imply that wealthier cultivators are less likely to be share-tenants, but wealthier cultivators also
tend to have more capital and other unobserved inputs. If (following Stiglitz, 1974) share-tenants are
more risk averse, then they are also likely to be less productive than owner-cultivators because, ﬁrstly, risk
aversion is negatively related to wealth and, secondly, because greater risk aversion militates agains the use
of riskier but more productive techniques. Under double-sided moral hazard (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985),
both tenant and landlord supply a noncontractible input. In the landlord’s case, this can be farming
know-how, which the tenant is assumed to lack. Likewise, in Hallagan’s (1978) screening model, less able
cultivators endogenously select into sharecropping.
5land tends to be of lower quality than owner-cultivated land; i.e., E [ηci | sci =1 ]< 0.6
Thus, just as in the previous paragraph, ignoring this form of selection bias when it is
present would lead us to understate the productivity of share-tenancy vis à vis owner-
cultivation. Importantly, this means that a failure to ﬁnd a negative γ using a household
ﬁxed eﬀects estimator cannot be due to adverse selection, since adverse selection can only
make γ appear more negative. In other words, our estimate of the disincentive eﬀects of
share-tenancy is (at worst) an upper bound.
2.5 Productivity results
We focus on production of the ﬁve major crops: wheat, rice, cotton, sugarcane, and
maize. Wheat is the principal crop cultivated in the rabi season (November-May), whereas
rice, cotton, and maize are grown in the kharif season (May-November). Sugarcane is
grown year-round, but is usually planted in kharif. Land devoted to fodder and a number
of minor crops is excluded from consideration, as these outputs are diﬃcult to measure
accurately. In the IFPRI-93 sample, the ﬁve major crops account for 66% of cultivated
area (71% of sharecropped area); the corresponding ﬁgure for the nationally representative
PRHS-01 sample is 80% (83%). Yield is deﬁned as the value of output from these ﬁve
crops evaluated at median prices for that year divided by area planted to these crops.7
For ease of presentation of the yield results in Table 2, the dependent variable is scaled
(see Appendix) so that γ is interpretable as a percentage deviation relative to owner-
cultivators/ﬁxed renters.
Recall that the IFPRI-93 and PRHS-01 samples partly overlap to form a panel. For
our purposes, this overlap is not large given the criterion that households cultivate at
least one of the ﬁve major crops in both survey rounds. In our ﬁnal sample, 16% of
the households appear both in 1993 and 2001, contributing 29% of the plots. With
such panel data, there are two ways to implement the household ﬁxed eﬀects procedure
described in section 2.4: either group plot-level observations by household irrespective of
survey year (household basis), or group plots of a given household separately by survey
year (household-year basis). The latter speciﬁcation is less restrictive in that it allows
6While it is true that plots taken on ﬁxed rent are also subject to adverse selection, only 5% of our esti-
mation sample consists of renter-cum-sharecroppers. So, for the most part, we are comparing sharecropped
to owner-cultivated plots.
7A small number of observations (27 in all) were dropped because of probable coding errors that
generated excessive yields. Including these observations has a negligible impact on the results, but does
raise the standard errors on the coeﬃcient of interest by about 6%.
6for nonstationarity in household endowments (i.e., in νc).8 Since, in using the household
basis, it is likely that the same plot will appear twice in a given household group, we correct
the standard errors in this case for clustering on household.9 Table 1 breaks down the
number of plots available, by survey year. With respect to the household-year basis, the
yield sample consists of 1,718 plots belonging to households with multiple plots. Of these,
403 belong to owner-cum-sharecropper households,10 and the rest to pure sharecroppers
or owner-cultivator households. Including this latter group of households increases the
precision of the estimates when we control for plot characteristics. Using the household
basis boosts the multiple-plot household sample to 1,993 and the number of plots among
these cultivated by owner-cum-sharecroppers to 771.
Our regressions control for the most important plot characteristics: area, value, loca-
tion, irrigation, and soil type. We also control for the crop composition on a plot — i.e.,
the fraction of area planted to each of the ﬁve major crops — and allow these composition
eﬀects to vary by survey year so as to capture any changes in relative crop prices. Table
A.1 in the Appendix describes these variables.
While, in theory, crop choice may be speciﬁed in the tenancy contract, and hence
endogenous, in Pakistan, share-tenants generally have autonomy over crop choice and
grow basically the same mix of crops as owner-cultivators. Indeed, for all ﬁve of the major
crops in our yield measure, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the proportion of area
cultivated between sharecropped and other plots, once we control for tehsil (there are 23
tehsils or subdistricts in our sample).
The ﬁrst three speciﬁcations in Table 2 use the less restrictive household-year basis
for the ﬁxed eﬀects. Without any covariates, we ﬁnd that yields are about 3% lower
on sharecropped plots. Sequentially adding controls for plot characteristics and crop
composition in columns (2) and (3), respectively, lowers this estimate of γ only slightly,
along with the standard error. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the individual
coeﬃcients on the plot characteristics and crop composition variables. However, they are
highly jointly signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations as indicated in Table 2. Results are virtually
identical when we use the household basis for the ﬁxed eﬀects and there is no evident gain
8For example, in the eight years between the two rounds of the survey, a household’s farm assets or
ﬁnancial position may have changed.
9Because only households were followed and not individual plots, one cannot say for sure how many of
the same plots were captured in PRHS-01. However, it is likely that most of the owner-cultivated plots
and many of the leased plots belonging to panel households are in fact the same across survey rounds.
10Owner-cum-sharecropper households are over-represented in the IFPRI survey by geographical acci-
dent; these households tend to be concentrated in central Punjab.
7in precision from doing so. All in all, then, there is no signiﬁcant productivity diﬀerence
between sharecropped and owner-cultivated plots.
How informative is our failure to reject the null hypothesis of equal productivity?
Andrews’ (1989) inverse power (IP) function allows us to quantify the set of alternatives
against which our test has power. Based on yield speciﬁcation (3) in Table 2, we would
be equally likely as not to reject the null if the true yield diﬀerential were 6.5%; this ﬁgure
demarcates the region of low power. On the other hand, if the true yield diﬀerential were
13%, we would be 95% certain of rejecting the null. Thus, our test has high power against
yield diﬀerentials exceeding 13%.
Although 13% is a respectable number, we may do better with the more restrictive
village ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation. This estimator, the results of which are reported in
column (5) of Table 2, is not robust to the selection problem outlined above, but may be
more eﬃcient than household ﬁxed eﬀects, in part because it exploits a much larger 2,807
plot sample (see Table 1). In addition to village ﬁxed eﬀects, we allow for household
random eﬀects to deal with the correlation across plots within multi-plot households. As
it happens, the village ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of γ are less negative than their household
ﬁxed eﬀects counterparts, which would be contrary to expectations except for the fact
that this diﬀerence is not remotely signiﬁcant; the two estimates are within a standard
error of each other. Selection bias, therefore, does not appear to be a serious problem.11
With an almost 40% lower standard error, however, the village ﬁxed eﬀects estimator of γ
is much more precise than the ones based on household ﬁxed eﬀects. As a consequence,
we can now be 95% certain that the true yield diﬀerential is no greater than 8%.
2.6 Labor results
A more direct test for moral hazard is to compare the cultivator’s family labor input
on sharecropped versus owned plots. IFPRI-93 (but not PRHS-01) provides information
on plot-level labor inputs. These data are collected for each type of worker (adult male
and female, and male and female child), but since the vast majority of farm labor is
supplied by adult men in this sample, we sum the days of all worker types. Farm labor
inputs are also disaggregated by task (plowing/irrigation, sowing, weeding, harvesting,
and threshing), which we initially combine. On average, families supply a total of 16 days
a n n u a l l yf o re a c ha c r ec u l t i v a t e d .
11Again using the IP function, we can be 95% certain that the household ﬁxed eﬀect estimate of the yield
diﬀerential is within 11 percentage points of the village ﬁxed eﬀect (household random eﬀect) estimate.
In other words, we would be very likely to detect moderate selection bias if it existed.
8For the family labor input regressions in the lower panels of Table 2, we use essentially
the same approach as we did with yields.12 Based on the household ﬁxed eﬀects estimates,
we ﬁnd that total family labor per acre is about 6% lower on sharecropped plots than on
owner-cultivated plots, but this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant. Unlike the case of yields, the
estimated magnitude of the labor diﬀerential falls considerably after adding the controls.
The village ﬁxed eﬀects estimate is somewhat more precise than that based on household
ﬁxed eﬀects, but in this case a Hausman test rejects the former speciﬁcation (p-value
=0 .006). Conservatively, then, our test of the null of zero moral hazard has high power
against family labor use diﬀerentials on the order of 20%.
A more powerful test of moral hazard focuses on those tasks that are diﬃcult to con-
tract. Data from the farm wage employment section of PRHS-01 indicate that harvesting
eﬀort is much easier to monitor than eﬀort in land preparation, weeding, and so forth.
Two-thirds of all annual paid labor days in agriculture are for harvesting, compared to
just 7% for weeding and 4% for tilling, and harvesting jobs are much more likely to pay
piece rates, which rely on directly observing output or eﬀort. Thus, using a family labor
regression that excludes days spent harvesting and threshing (almost half of all family
labor devoted to the average plot), the null hypothesis of zero moral hazard should be
more likely to be rejected if it is indeed false. These regressions are estimated on exactly
t h es a m es a m p l ea sf o rt o t a lf a m i l yl a b o r( s e eT a b l e1 ) ,a n dt h er e s u l t sa r er e p o r t e di n
the bottom panel of Table 2. Surprisingly, the diﬀerential between sharecropped and
owner-cultivated plots in terms of noncontractible family labor is only 2% (column (3)).
This leads us to suspect that even the 6% overall family labor diﬀerential may overstate
the extent of moral hazard.
2.7 Discussion
To sum up, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant yield shortfall on share-tenanted land vis à vis
owner-cultivated/rented land. Using similar procedures and data, Shaban (1987) obtains
as i g n i ﬁcant 16% yield diﬀerential in six south Indian villages. We can rule out an eﬀect
of such magnitude with virtual certainty in neighboring Pakistan. Shaban also estimates
that owner-cum-sharecroppers allocate 21% less male family labor overall (47% less female
labor) to their sharecropped plots than they do to their owned plots (ICRISAT labor data
12We do, however, take logs of labor hours instead of levels, as the former gives higher within R
2s in the
ﬁxed eﬀect regressions and thus considerably lower standard errors. The standard errors of the percentage
changes are calculated using the approximation formula given by van Garderen and Shah (2002).
9are not disaggregated by task). Based on our ﬁndings, family labor diﬀerentials this large
in rural Pakistan are highly improbable.
Otsuka, et al. (1992), faced with similar (though perhaps less conclusive) evidence,
echo Johnson (1950) in surmising that supervision and enforcement of share-tenant eﬀort
must be broadly eﬀective. Sharecropping, they argue, is adopted as long as monitoring
costs are low enough to make it worthwhile relative to ﬁxed rental. They go on to suggest
that "signiﬁcant ineﬃciency of share-tenancy is expected to arise only when the scope
of contract choice is institutionally restricted" (p. 2007). Thus, rather than evidence
of the general ineﬃciency of sharecropping, they view Shaban’s (1987) ﬁndings as an
aberration arising from India’s legal environment. When land-to-the-tiller legislation
eﬀectively penalized long-term tenancy contracts, many landlords with high supervision
costs switched from ﬁxed rent to share contracts, since sharecroppers were easier to disguise
as permanent farm laborers.
The proposition that sharecropper productivity increases with the degree of supervi-
sion has, however, rarely been subjected to empirical testing.13 The rest of this paper
formalizes and carries out such a test.
3 A tenancy model with supervision
3.1 Costless supervision
When tenant eﬀort can be monitored and enforced at zero cost, eﬀort levels are ﬁrst-
best. Using our earlier notation, the landlord selects a ﬁxed payment α, an output share
β, tenant eﬀort e,a n dx to
Max (1 − β)π(e,x)+α s.t. (2)
βπ(e,x) − v(e) − α ≥ 0
where the second line is the tenant’s participation constraint (PC) with outside utility
normalized to zero.14 The optimal (e∗,x ∗) sets fe = ve and fx = p. Contract type is
13Ai et al. (1997) is the only other attempt that we are aware of. Using a diﬀerent modelling approach
and plot-level data from a single Tunisian village, they ﬁnd, paradoxically, that crop yield is a decreasing
function of the frequency of landlord visits to the tenant.
14The ﬁxed payment α may be negative, in which case the contract has a credit element to the extent
that such payments are made up front. This ‘loan’ is repaid at harvest time through the output share β.
Formally, the model abstracts from the timing of payments.
10indeterminate, as the landlord can choose any combination of α and β that satisfy the
tenant’s PC.
Next, we introduce a ﬁnancial constraint (FC) as in Laﬀont and Matoussi (1995), which
speciﬁe st h a tt h et e n a n tc a n n o tb em a d et op a ym o r eu pf r o n tt h a nh eh a si nw e a l t hw.
The tenant’s up-front contributions to rent (α) and input costs (βpx) are thus constrained
by α + βpx ≤ w. Since the landlord can still choose tenant eﬀort costlessly, the addition
of the FC has no eﬃciency implications; eﬀort is still ﬁrst-best. However, tenants with
wealth below a certain threshold will be oﬀered crop-sharing contracts, as they cannot
aﬀord the up-front payments that a ﬁxed rent contract ( β =1 )entails.15
3.2 Costly supervision
When tenant eﬀort is prohibitively costly to observe, the presence of a binding FC
does have eﬃciency implications. While tenants with suﬃcient wealth (w ≥ w)g e tﬁxed
rent (FR) contracts and provide ﬁrst best eﬀort e∗,p o o r e rt e n a n t s( w<w )g e ts h a r e( S)
contracts and provide less eﬀort, es <e ∗. Figure 1 shows the landlord’s return falling with
tenant wealth, as the amount that can be extracted up-front declines. Below a certain
wealth level, however, the landlord may prefer to relinquish some rents to the tenant to
induce eﬀort. We assume that this case is not empirically relevant, perhaps because, as
Laﬀont and Matoussi argue, the landlord would prefer a wage contract over share-tenancy
for such a low-wealth agent. Given that the PC is binding, the landlord’s return for a
tenant with w<wis rs = π(es,x s) − v(es).
Suppose now that, as an alternative to leaving his tenant unsupervised, the landlord
can monitor eﬀo r t ,b u ta tac o s t . 16 Let c(e) represent the cost of implementing a given
level of eﬀort, where ce > 0 and cee ≥ 0. The landlord’s problem is now
Max (1 − β)π(e,x)+α − c(e) s.t. (3)
βπ(e,x) − v(e) − α ≥ 0
α + βpx − w ≤ 0.
15Allowing the landlord to set the tenant’s share of the input cost independently from the output share
has no eﬀect on this or on subsequent analyses. When the ﬁnancial constraint is binding, the input share
drops out of both the landlord’s objective function and the tenant’s participation constraint; only the total
amount that the tenant pays up front is relevant to the contracting parties.
16Demougin and Fluet (2001) and Allgulin and Ellingsen (2002) examine supervision in a principal-agent
framework with ex-post limited liability and a probablistic monitoring technology, but these models are
not well-suited to our application.
11The interesting case involves share-tenancy (i.e., FC binding), as monitoring is redundant
in a ﬁxed rent contract. Under the monitored share (MS) contract, eﬀort is chosen
according to fe = ve + ce. Since the cost to the landlord of inducing tenant eﬀort is
always higher than the tenant’s marginal disutility, optimal eﬀort is em <e ∗.
In the MS contract, the tenant’s PC is binding at all wealth levels and the landlord’s
return, rm = π(em,x m) − v(em) − c(em), is independent of tenant wealth. Let θ index
landlords such that dc(e;θ)/dθ > 0. Figure 1 shows two landlords, H and L, with high
and low supervision costs, respectively, such that θL < θH and hence rL
m >r H
m.F o r
landlord L,i ti so p t i m a lt oo ﬀer the MS contract to any tenant with wealth below wL
and to oﬀer the S contract to any tenant with w ∈ [wL,w). The same applies to landlord
H at wealth threshold wH <w L.G i v e n ∂rs/∂θ =0and ∂rm/∂θ < 0,i tf o l l o w st h a t
Proposition 1 An increase in θ lowers the wealth threshold below which the landlord
supervises his share-tenant, but has no eﬀect on the wealth threshold above which he oﬀers
a ﬁxed rent contract.
We are now ready to address our main question: Does landlord supervision increase
the productivity of a share-tenancy, holding tenant wealth constant? The way to think
about this for, say, landlord L is to ﬁxt e n a n tw e a l t ha ts o m ew that is just epsilon above
wL, so that he chooses contract S.N o w l o w e r θ (raise rm)b ys o m et i n ya m o u n td e l t as o
that the landlord is just willing to switch the tenant from the S to the MS contract. The








s ) − v(eL
s )] >c (eL
m) > 0.F u r t h e r ,
since the function π − v attains a maximum at (e∗,x ∗) and both eL
m and eL
s are less than
e∗, π −v must be increasing over this range of eﬀort. It follows, therefore, that eL
m >e L
s .
The landlord must get more eﬀort out of the tenant in the MS contract in order to justify
his added supervision cost. Thus, we have
Proposition 2 Under Assumption A.1 and for a given w, yield is higher in a share-
contract with supervision than in one without supervision.
3.3 Matching equilibrium
It is easily seen that landlords with high supervision costs prefer high wealth tenants
at least as much as landlords with low supervision costs. Since the tenant’s PC is always
binding, the total surplus from a landlord-tenant match is given by ri =m a x {ri
m,ri
s},
12i = L,H. With two types of landlords (high/low supervision costs) and two types of
tenants (high/low wealth), social surplus is ψ(w,w )=rL(w)+rH(w ) for any pair of
tenants (w,w ). One can verify using Figure 1 that ψ(w,w ) ≥ ψ(w ,w) for any tenant
pair such that w<w  . I nt h ec a s ew h e r ew  <w L, for instance, landlord L’s relatively
high payoﬀ from the MS contract is invariant to tenant wealth, whereas landlord H’s
payoﬀ is increasing in w. Higher surplus is thus achieved when the richer tenant works
H’s land on an S contract instead of L’s land on an MS contract.
We can now sketch out a simple model of landlord-tenant matching with search fric-
tions. Prior to contracting, potential tenants randomly drawn from the wealth distribution
arrive sequentially before landlords who can either accept or reject them. If rejected, the
tenant reenters the candidate pool.17 Given that searching for tenants is costly, landlords
will adopt a "reservation wealth" strategy; that is, they will make a hire once they ﬁnd a
tenant whose wealth exceeds a given threshold. Since, by the above argument, landlords
with higher supervision costs must have higher reservation wealth, we obtain
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, tenant wealth and landlord supervision costs are positively,
but not perfectly, correlated.
4 Are Supervised Sharecroppers More Productive?
4.1 Quantifying landlord supervision
PRHS-01 asks each share-tenant "during [kharif/rabi season] how many times did
the landlord meet with you to discuss or supervise your activities on this plot." In case
the landlord employed labor overseers, or kamdars, the same question was asked about
meetings between the tenant and these individuals as well. Very few share-tenants (less
than 4%) report never having had supervisory meetings with their landlord or with a
kamdar during the year (meetings with kamdars occurred in about a quarter of share-
tenancies). On one-half of all sharecropped plots, tenants report having had more than 30
meetings per year with their landlord/kamdar,a n d ,o nh a l fo ft h e s ep l o t s ,t e n a n t sc l a i m
to have had at least 90 meetings. While many of these conversations may have occurred
during non-crucial periods or were not otherwise intended to elicit or enforce eﬀort on the
part of the tenant, it is clear that share-tenants in Pakistan are not being left to their own
17It is reasonable to assume in our setting that tenants also face search costs, thus allowing landlords to
make "take-it-or-leave-it" oﬀers at the time of contracting.
13devices (Nabi, 1986, provides similar evidence in a smaller scale survey).18
We certainly do not want to treat supervision intensity as linear in the number of
meetings, since there must be diminishing returns beyond a point, and possibly increasing
returns at very low numbers of meetings as well. The simplest empirical approach, and
the one we adopt here, is to assume a threshold number of annual meetings above which
a tenant can be considered ‘supervised’. But, what should this threshold be? This is a
question on which we will let the data speak.
To this end, we estimate a version of Hansen’s (1999) threshold regression model for
panel data. Let mci be the number of meetings that cultivator c on plot i had with his
landlord (deﬁned only for sharecropped plots). Our modiﬁed yield regression is then
yci = γsci + δsciI(mci >k )+ω xci + νc + ηci (4)
where I(·) is the indicator function and k is the threshold, which is treated as a para-
meter to be estimated. For ease of interpretation, we demean the supervision indicator
using E [I(mci >k )|sci =1 ] ,s ot h a tγ continues to estimate the mean diﬀerence in yields
between sharecropped and owner-cultivated/rented plots.
Selection bias could be a problem here as well. Or, to put it another way, supervision
could be endogenous. Landlords may choose which tenants to supervise based on ability or
other unobserved productive attributes. If, for example, low productivity cultivators are
monitored more intensively, then we would ﬁnd a spurious negative relationship between
yields and supervision. Estimation of equation 4 with household ﬁxed eﬀects, as in section
2, can correct for this problem to the extent that the cultivator-speciﬁc unobservable is
constant across tenanted and owned plots. But, this estimator it not robust to selection
on tenant type. In particular, landlords may decide which tenants to supervise based on
tenant characteristics that do not inﬂuence productivity on the tenant’s own land. This
would essentially give rise to an additional error component of the form sciµc.T op u r g e
this component, we use a sample of tenant households with multiple sharecropped plots
(sci =1∀i) to estimate the following regression by household ﬁxed eﬀects:
yci = δI(mci >k )+θ xci + µc +νc + ηci, (5)
where µc + νc is the ﬁxed eﬀect (and γ is absorbed in the constant term).
18Supervision is most intense in Sindh province (with a median of 48 annual meetings versus 8 for the
remaining three provinces taken together), where landlords typically have larger holdings and are more
likely to employ kamdars.
144.2 Supervision and Productivity
4.2.1 Main results
Our analysis of supervision and yields is based on a sample of 1256 plots cultivated
by multi-plot households in PRHS-01 (see Table 1). Replicating speciﬁcation (3) in Table
2 on this smaller sample, we obtain a yield diﬀerential of -4.2% (4.8), which is very similar
to, but less precise than, our earlier result. To estimate the monitoring threshold k,w e
search over values of mci within a reasonable range and ﬁnd the e k that minimizes the sum
of squared residuals (
S
e η2
ci) from equation 4 (see Hansen, 1999, for details).19 Although
conventional standard errors on the coeﬃcients in equation 4, which treat e k as the true
value of k, are asymptotically valid, the test of the null hypothesis δ =0is non-standard,
since k is not identiﬁed under the null. We thus adopt the bootstrap F-test proposed by
Hansen (1999).
Household ﬁxed eﬀects regressions, including plot characteristics and crop composition,
a r er e p o r t e di nT a b l e3 . F o rb a s e l i n es p e c i ﬁcation (1), the estimation algorithm produces
an optimal threshold value of 10 meetings. In other words, the deﬁnition of supervision
that best ﬁts the data is one in which the tenant meets his landlord at least 11 times
per year, or about once each month. Notice that the average yield diﬀerential between
sharecropped plots and owner-cultivated/rented plots remains about -4% after including
this supervision variable. Supervised tenants, however, achieve 28% higher yields than
unsupervised ones, and this diﬀerence is just about signiﬁcant using the bootstrap F-test
(p-value=0.051). According to our data-derived deﬁnition, about two-thirds of the 351
share-tenanted plots in this sample receive supervision from their landlords and/or the
landlord’s kamdar.20 Viewed in comparison to owner/rented cultivated plots (after a
suitable rescaling of the coeﬃcients), plots cultivated by supervised tenants realize 3.0%
(5.6) higher yields, a trivial diﬀerence. By contrast, land cultivated by unsupervised
tenants is 17.8% (7.2) less productive than owner/renter cultivated land. This latter
ﬁgure is remarkably close to the -16% yield diﬀerential relative to owner-cultivated land
found by Shaban (1987) for all share-tenanted plots in his Indian sample.
19We restrict the search for k between the 10th and 50th percentiles of mci among the 351 sharecropped
plots in this sample. The 50th percentile is 21 annual meetings, which is already fairly intensive supervision.
20Note that this subsample of tenants is somewhat unrepresentative as it excludes sharecroppers of single
plots, who are more likely to be from Sindh province and have large landlords. Supervision is considerably
higher (75%) in the full sample of share-tenants.
154.2.2 Robustness
To assess robustness to other potentially confounding factors, we ﬁxt h ev a l u eo f
e k at 10 and add alternative sets of controls. Our ﬁrst concern is that supervision is
picking up characteristics of the tenancy that may have independent eﬀects on yields.
Perhaps newer tenants, whose abilities are less familiar to the landlord, are more heavily
supervised and are also less productive. Speciﬁcation (2) in Table 3 thus includes a
dummy variable indicating that the share-tenancy has lasted no more than 3 years; it does
n o ta t t r a c tas i g n i ﬁcant coeﬃcient. The number of landlord-tenant meetings could also
reﬂect the social relationship between the two, which may have independent productivity
eﬀects. Yet, there is no evidence that this is the case, given the insigniﬁcant eﬀect of
a dummy for whether the landlord and tenant are related (including membership in the
same caste/clan). Lastly, wealthier landlords may supervise more and, at the same time,
might provide more or better quality inputs to their tenants. In speciﬁcation (3), we
control for the land, tractor, and tubewell ownership of the landlord, which, as before, has
a negligible impact on the supervision coeﬃcient. Speciﬁc a t i o n( 4 )i n c l u d e sb o t hs e t so f
extra control variables together, also with no change in e δ.
Another type of concern is that tenants on certain plots — for example, those that are
more fertile — receive more supervision and that these plots give systematically diﬀerent
yields. Although we cannot control for unobserved attributes of the plot, we can check
whether the estimates change when we do not control for observed attributes. As empha-
sized by Altonji, et al. (2005), such tests are only as good as the explanatory power of the
covariates. In the present case, the removal of all plot-level controls from speciﬁcation
(1) reduces the within household R2 substantially, from 0.091 to 0.017. At the same
time, the estimate of δ becomes 25.4( 1 1 .1), which is practically indistinguishable from its
counterpart in Table 3. Thus, to the extent that selection on observables is an accurate
guide to selection on unobservables, our estimates are unlikely to suﬀer from the latter
problem.
Our ﬁnal set of robustness checks allows for the possibility that supervision is corre-
lated with unobserved tenant characteristics. Table 4 presents estimates of equation 5
on the sub-sample of 113 households that cultivate at least two plots on share contracts
(264 plots in all). Thus, instead of comparing yields on sharecropped plots (supervised
or unsupervised) with yields on owned/rented plots cultivated by the same households,
as in Table 3, here we compare yields on supervised sharecropped plots with yields on
unsupervised plots cultivated by the same households.I n s p e c i ﬁcation (1), we run the
16threshold estimation algorithm with household ﬁxed eﬀects on this new sample to obtain
e k =9 , practically the same value as before. In this case, however, the eﬀect of supervision
is quite large, raising yields by 73% versus our earlier 28%, and highly signiﬁcant, with
the bootstrap F-test p-value coming in at 0.006. Speciﬁcations (2)-(4) show, once again,
that e δ is robust to the inclusion of the additional controls. In sum, our ﬁnding that
landlord supervision enhances yield on sharecropped plots does not appear to be driven
by tenant-speciﬁc unobservables. Indeed, 28% may well be a lower bound on the impact
of supervision on sharecropper productivity.
5 Supervision Costs and the Form of Tenancy Contract
5.1 Econometric Model
We have argued that diﬀerences in the form of tenancy, and, ultimately, in tenant
productivity, are driven by variation in costs of supervision. To test this proposition
directly, we now turn to an analysis of the landlord’s choice among alternative tenancy
contracts. Based on the theory in section 3, we build an econometric model of landlord
choice across S, MS and FR(ﬁxed rent) contracts from the following equations:
rm = aθ + κm x (6a)
rs = bw + κs x (6b)
w = σ1 x (6c)
w = cθ + ξ (6d)
The ﬁrst two equations are linearized versions of the two return functions. The landlord’s
return on the MS contract depends negatively on his supervision costs (a<0),b u ti s
invariant to tenant wealth, whereas the return on the S contract is increasing in tenant
wealth (b>0), but invariant to supervision costs. Each return function, as well as the
ﬁxed rental wealth threshold w,a r ea l s oa l l o w e dt od e p e n do np l o tc h a r a c t e r i s t i c sx (which
includes a constant). Equation 6d is the matching function with match error ξ being the
sole source of randomness.21 Proposition 3 implies that c>0.
21See, e.g., Ackerberg and Botticini (2002). These authors also allow for imperfect observability of
principal/agent characteristics by the econometrician. In our case, θ can be proxied by a variable z such
that θ = λz + u, where u is a measurement error and sign(λ) is known a priori. It is easy to see, after
substitution into equations 6a and 6d, that this generalization merely adds another independent source
17Putting these equations together, the landlord’s choices are characterized as follows:
MS ⇐⇒ rm >r s ⇐⇒ ξ <d 1θ + σ2 x
S ⇐⇒ rm ≤ rs and w<w⇐⇒ d1θ + σ2 x ≤ ξ <d 2θ + σ1 x (7)
FR ⇐⇒ w ≥ w ⇐⇒ d2θ + σ1 x ≤ ξ
where d1 =( a
b − c),d 2 = −c, and σ2 =( κm − κs)/b. Contract choice probabilities can
thus be estimated using an ordered logit model, generalized to allow the slope coeﬃcients
to vary with the categorical value of the dependent variable.
There are three testable restrictions: d1 < 0, d2 < 0,a n dd1 − d2 < 0.I n t u i t i v e l y ,
higher supervision costs aﬀect contract choice by directly lowering the landlord’s return
to monitoring a tenant as well as by increasing the attractiveness to him of wealthier
tenants, who can be given stronger incentives and concomitantly less supervision. The
combination of these two eﬀects, however, operates only at the margin between the MS
and S contract, whereas the matching eﬀect alone operates at the margin between the S
and FRcontract (cf., proposition 1). This fact allows us to identify the ratio of structural
determinants of contract choice, i.e., a
b = d1 − d2, subject to the usual normalization in a
discrete choice model.
5.2 Contract choice results
PRHS-01 not only asks landlords about each of their tenants and the terms of their
contract, but also about the number of supervisory meetings that they or their kamdars
had with their tenant. Thus, we can use the threshold number of annual landlord-tenant
meetings (10) estimated in section 4 to construct an analogous supervision indicator on the
landlord side. Based on this deﬁnition, out of 609 leased plots in our landlord sample, 29%
are given on ﬁxed rent, 25% on ‘unsupervised’ share-contracts, and 46% on ‘supervised’
share-contracts.22
of error in the contract choice equations. The reason for the irrelevance of the proxy relationship here
is that, contrary to Ackerberg and Botticini, we do not condition on both observed principal and agent
characteristics in the contract choice model.
22Because Sindh is dominated by very large landowners, with a low sampling probability, our subsample
of 432 sharecropped plots on the landlord side is weighted toward NWFP (44%) and away from Sindh
(25%). By, contrast, 52% of the 351 sharecropped plots in the Table 3 sample are in Sindh, compared to
25% in NWFP. The upshot is that the use of kamdars, largely a Sindh phenomenon, is rarely reported in
the landlord sample, and the overall intensity of supervision is somewhat lower than on the tenant side.
18To implement the econometric model, we need a variable that shifts the cost of
supervision. A natural candidate for θ is a measure of the accessibility of the plot to
the landlord. We use the location of the plot relative to the landlord’s village; 14% of
plots are outside the landlord’s village of residence. Although we do not have the actual
distance between the plot and the landlord’s house, in most cases a plot in a diﬀerent
village will not be within walking distance, whereas a plot inside the village will be no
more than a kilometer or two away.
Table 5 reports the generalized ordered logit estimates based on 7. Included in x are
the plot characteristics used previously, plus dummies for whether the contract applies to
the kharif or rabi seasons only and dummies for the four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, NWFP,
and Balochistan). The ﬁrst two columns under speciﬁcation (1) report the estimates of the
threshold parameters for, respectively, the margin between the S and MS contracts and
the margin between the FRand the S contracts. Thus, for example, the coeﬃcient -1.59
in the ﬁrst column is an estimate of d1 (scaled by the error variance) and the coeﬃcient
-0.766 in the second column is the corresponding estimate of d2. As indicated in the
table, we can strongly reject all three null hypotheses, d1 =0 , d2 =0 ,a n dd1 = d2 against
their respective one-sided alternatives, d1 < 0, d2 < 0,a n dd1 − d2 < 0.
A possible caveat, however, is that only a select group of landlord’s may own plots
outside their village. These landlords, in turn, may prefer particular types of contracts
for reasons unrelated to supervision costs on the plot. For example, large and wealthy
landlords may be more likely to own distant plots and to supervise their share-tenants. To
address this problem, speciﬁcation (2) of the contract choice model controls for landlord
characteristics; namely, ownership of land, tractors and tubewells. While these asset
variables do signiﬁcantly aﬀect the choice between S and MS contracts (although not in
a consistent direction), their inclusion has little eﬀect on the results of interest. Indeed,
our key ﬁnding that greater supervision costs lower the returns to tenant monitoring (i.e.,
a
b < 0) is even strengthened.
6 Conclusions
Recent research suggests that tenancy or land reform may be among the elusive ‘win-
win’ policies. While redistributing land rights to poor peasants clearly has attractive
equity implications, Banerjee, et al.’s (2002) ﬁndings imply that such redistributions can
lead to large eﬃciency gains as well. This paper delivers a less sanguine conclusion. Our
19evidence shows that gross productivity of land cultivated by sharecroppers diﬀers little
from that of land cultivated by owners and ﬁxed renters. At most, this yield diﬀerential
can be 8%, and our point estimates are less than half this magnitude. In Pakistan, at
least, giving higher powered incentives to share-tenants would not have a dramatic impact
on agricultural productivity.23
The overall eﬃciency implications, however, are more diﬃcult to assess. Maintaining
share-tenant productivity requires fairly heavy landlord supervision. Our evidence shows
that yield on land cultivated by sharecroppers who are monitored by their landlords —
the majority of share-tenants in Pakistan — is at least 28% higher than yield on land
cultivated by unmonitored sharecroppers. Since this supervision is costly to the landlord,
either in his own time or in money (for hiring labor overseers), redistributing land rights
would generate an eﬃciency gain by eliminating the need to supervise. Nevertheless, it
is improbable that the total resources expended on supervising tenants would come close
to matching the gross return on supervision uncovered in this paper, although a deﬁnitive
answer to this question must await further research.
Putting aside the policy question, this paper has also shown how explicit treatment of
landlord supervision and recognition of heterogeneity in productivity diﬀerentials can cut
through some of the confusion in the existing empirical literature on sharecropping. It is at
least empirically plausible that Shaban’s (1987) inﬂuential ﬁnding of a large productivity
advantage of owner-cultivation over sharecropping is due to legal constraints on tenancy
that eﬀectively created a large number of unsupervised sharecroppers. More broadly,
this paper provides evidence on an important element underlying the form of incentive
contracts: the principal’s cost of supervision. Further work along these lines would greatly
enhance our understanding of real-world contracting problems.
23In Jacoby and Mansuri (2006), we reach similar conclusions regarding land-speciﬁci n v e s t m e n t . A l -
though such investment is substantially lower on tenanted land, the eﬀect on yields is probably quite
small.
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22Figure 1: Supervision-Incentive tradeoﬀ
23T a b l e1 :N u m b e ro fP l o t si nE s t i m a t i o nS a m p l e s
Major Crop Yield Family
household-year basis hh basis Labor
Household type IFPRI-93 PRHS-01 Total Total IFPRI-93
OCSa 163 240 403 771 234
(81) (113) (194) (348) (119)
Multi-plot 462 1256c 1718b 1993b 692b
(174) (351) (525) (624) (236)
All types 719 2088 2807b 2807 882b
(279) (670) (949) (949) (322)
Multi-plot – 264d –– –
sharecropper (264)
Notes: Number of sharecropped plots in parentheses. The household basis groups
plots of a given household together regardless of survey year; household-year basis
groups plots of a given household separately by survey year. Family labor data are
available only in IFPRI-93.
aOwner-cum-sharecropper, but also includes a few renter-cum-sharecroppers.
bSee Table 2. Multi-plot households used in household ﬁxed eﬀect estimation;
all types used in village ﬁxed eﬀects estimation.
cSee Table 3.
dSee Table 4.
24Table 2: Eﬀect of Sharecropping on Yields and Family Labor
Type of ﬁxed eﬀects: Household-year Household Village
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Normalized yield
%d i ﬀerential (γ) -2.7 -2.8 -2.3 -2.1 -0.0
Standard error (4.2) (4.2) (3.9) (3.9) (2.5)
Controls – A A,B A,B A,B
p-value controls – 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Family labor in all tasks a
%d i ﬀerential (γ) -18.1 -8.7 -6.4 – 5.3
Standard error (8.1) (7.0) (7.0) (5.4)
Controls – A A,B – A,B
p-value controls – 0.000 0.000 0.000
Family labor in all tasks except harvesting/threshinga
%d i ﬀerential (γ) -12.9 -4.2 -1.9 – 6.1
Standard error (9.6) (8.4) (8.3) (6.2)
Controls – A A,B – A,B
p-value controls – 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: See Table 1 for samples and Appendix Table A.1 for variable deﬁnitions
and descriptive statistics: A = {plot characteristics}, B = {crop composition}.
All speciﬁcations use ﬁxed eﬀects at household or village level as indicated.
Standard error adjusted for household clustering in column (4). Village ﬁxed
eﬀects speciﬁcations in column (5) include household random eﬀects.
aCoeﬃcients and standard errors from logarithmic speciﬁcations are converted to
percentage changes. No distinction between household and household-year
ﬁxed eﬀects since labor data are available only in IFPRI-93.
25Table 3: Landlord Supervision and Yields
Mean (s.d.) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sharecropped plota 0.28 -4.4 -5.0 -2.5 -3.7
(4.8) (4.9) (4.9) (5.0)
Supervised (mci > e k)b 0.65 28.1 27.4 25.8 24.9
(10.9) (11.0) (11.0) (11.0)
Tenant characteristicsb
Recent (≤ 3 yrs.) 0.29 – -5.7 – -1.8
(10.2) (10.3)
Relative of landlord 0.34 – 10.0 – 16.7
(10.3) (11.0)
Landlord characteristicsb
Log of landholdings 5.78 – – 0.050 0.071
(1.64) (0.040) (0.043)
Owns a tractor 0.32 – – 12.7 10.4
(12.4) (12.5)
Owns a tubewell 0.21 – – 13.6 13.1
(14.8) (14.8)
p-value controls:
Plot characteristics 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Crop composition 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is major crop yield scaled
by average yield on unsupervised sharecropped plots ×100. All regressions include
household ﬁxed eﬀects. N = 1256 plots (see Table 1).
aCoeﬃcient renormalized to represent percentage change relative to owner-cultivation.
bSet to zero for non-sharecopped plots (means over 351 sharecropped plots).
26Table 4: Landlord Supervision and Yields among Multi-plot Sharecroppers
Mean (s.d.) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Supervised (mci > e k) 0.66 73.1 78.1 69.4 74.1
(22.4) (22.9) (23.2) (23.8)
Tenant characteristics
Recent (≤ 3 yrs.) 0.26 – 19.5 – 21.0
(18.3) (18.6)
Relative of landlord 0.30 – 12.3 – 16.8
(19.7) (20.7)
Landlord characteristics
Log of landholdings 5.87 – – 0.038 0.067
(1.71) (0.081) (0.085)
Owns a tractor 0.35 – – 6.4 2.9
(20.1) (20.3)
Owns a tubewell 0.22 – – 6.4 7.5
(31.6) (31.7)
p-value controls:
Plot characteristics 0.157 0.116 0.200 0.136
Crop composition 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is major crop yield scaled
by average yield on unsupervised sharecropped plots ×100. All regressions include
household ﬁxed eﬀects. N = 264 plots (see Table 1).
27Table 5: Generalized Ordered Logit Model of Contract Choice
Mean (1) (2)
(s.d.) S - MSa FR - Sb S-M S a FR - Sb
Plot outside landlord’s village 0.14 -1.59 -0.766 -1.73 -0.727
(0.367) (0.382) (0.427) (0.389)
H0 : di =0 vs. [0.000] [0.022] [0.000] [0.031]
H1 : di < 0 i =1 ,2
Landlord characteristics
Log of landholdings 3.96 – – 0.648 0.192
(1.43) (0.242) (0.165)
[0.007] [0.246]
Owns a tractor 0.11 – – -1.33 0.511
(0.593) (0.567)
[0.024] [0.367]
Owns a tubewell 0.10 – – 1.10 -0.656
(0.519) (0.505)
[0.033] [0.194]
H0 : d1 = d2 vs. H1 : d1 <d 2 [0.012] [0.002]
Other plot characteristics: χ2
(8) [0.042] [0.014] [0.103] [0.049]
Note: Standard errors, adjusted for village-level clustering, in parentheses; p-values (one-
sided for the relevant structural hypotheses tests) in square brackets. Each equation includes all
plot characteristics listed in Appendix, dummies for seasonal leases, and province dummies.
Sample size is 609 landlord-owned plots.
aIndex function coeﬃcients for threshold between unmonitored and monitored share contract.
bIndex function coeﬃcients for threshold between ﬁxed rent and unmonitored share contract.
28Appendix
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics
IFPRI - 93 PRHS - 01
Owned/Rented Sharecropped Owned/Rented Sharecropped
Plot area (acres)a 10.8 9.9 8.3 7.4
(15.4) (8.9) (14.1) (8.2)
log(plot value/acre) 10.6 10.3 9.5 9.1
(1.1) (1.1) (1.0) (1.0)
Plot outside village 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.11
Year-round canal 0.43 0.58 0.31 0.53
irrigation
Seasonal canal 0.09 0.10 0.23 0.21
irrigation
Tubewell access 0.18 0.10 0.57 0.46
Sandy soil 0.11 0.19 0.18 0.24
Maira soil 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.20
Chikni soil 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.36
Cottonb 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.09
Riceb 0.19 0.38 0.15 0.30
Sugarcaneb 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.12
Maizeb 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.06
Normalized yieldc 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.02
(0.75) (0.66) (0.71) (0.66)
N 440 279 1418 670
Notes: Means (Std. Dev.) for village ﬁxed eﬀects sample (2807 plots). Omitted categories: canal
irrigation = none; soil type = clay.
aEntered in logs in the regressions.
bFraction of area planted to ﬁve major crops (omitted crop is wheat).
cValue of ﬁve major crops per acre scaled by year-speciﬁc mean for owned/rented plots.
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